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ABSTRACT
Recent literature argues that legal traditions of nations, i.e. their belonging to 
the world of common law or civil law, are not neutral in terms of economic 
or institutional performance, especially with regard to key opportunities in 
developing countries out of poverty. 
We present the results of an exploratory exploitation of the “institutional 
profiles database” provided by DGTPE (French Ministry of Economy and 
Finance) and French Development Agency (survey 2009) supplemented by 
data on legal origin and other variables from La Porta et al. We highlight 
specificities of developing countries having inherited the French law (relative 
to those of English law). A reflection on political power and the state finds 
a strong contrast between the ideal-typical model of French law and the 
empirical findings. This contrast is consistent with the notion rather than real 
state in the former French colonies.
kEY WORDS: 
Legal traditions, development, colonization
JEL CLASSIFICATION:
B52, F54, O52
RESUMEN
La literatura reciente argumenta que la tradición legal de las naciones, por 
ejemplo aquellas pertenecientes al mundo de la ley común y la ley civil, 
no son neutrales en términos de desempeño económico o institucional, 
especialmente en referencia a oportunidades clave para sacar de la pobreza 
a los países subdesarrollados. 
Presentamos los resultados de una explotación exploratoria de las “bases 
de datos de perfiles institucionales” suministrados por la DGTPE (Ministerio 
Francés de Economía y Finanzas) y de la Agencia Francesa para el Desarrollo 
(encuesta de 2009) complementada con datos sobre el origen legal y otras 
variables de La Porta et al. Resaltamos las especificaciones de los países 
subdesarrollados que heredaron las leyes francesas (relativas a aquellas de las 
leyes inglesas). Una reflexión sobre el poder político y el Estado encuentra un 
fuerte contraste entre el modelo típico ideal de la ley francesa y los hallazgos 
empíricos. Este contraste es consistente con la noción en lugar del estado real 
de las antiguas colonias francesas.
Palabras clave: tradiciones legales, desarrollo, colonización.
Clasificación JEL: B52, F54, O52.
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RESUMO
A literatura recente argumenta que a tradição legal das naciones, por 
exemplo aquelas pertencentes ao mundo da lei comum e a lei civil, 
não são neutras em termos de desempenho econômico ou institucional, 
especialmente em referência a oportunidades chave para tirar da pobreza 
os países subdesenvolvidos. 
Apresentamos os resultados de uma esplosão exploratória das “bases de 
datos de perfis institucionais” fornecidos pela DGTPE (Ministério Francês 
de Economia e Finanças) e da Agência Francesa para el Desenvolvimento 
(pesquisa de 2009) complementada com dados sobre a origen legal e 
outras variáveis de La Porta et al. Ressaltamos as especificações dos países 
subdesenvolvidos que herdaram as leis francesas (relativas a aquelas das 
leis inglesas). Uma reflexão sobre o poder político e o Estado encontra um 
forte contraste entre o modelo típico ideal da lei francesa e as evidências 
empíricas. Este contraste é consistente com a noção em lugar do estado real 
das antigas colônias francesas. 
Palavras chave: tradições legais, desenvolvimneto, colonização.
Classificação JEL: B52, F54, O52.
RÉSUMÉ
La littérature récente soutient que les traditions juridiques des nations, telles 
que leur appartenance au monde du droit civil ou de common law, ne sont 
pas neutres en termes de performances économiques ou institutionnelles, en 
particulier en ce qui concerne les principales opportunités dans les pays en 
développement à sortir de la pauvreté. Nous présentons les résultats d’une 
exploitation exploratoire de la «base de données des profils institutionnels» 
fourni par la DGTPE (Ministère français de l’Economie et des Finances) et 
l’Agence française de développement (enquête 2009) et des données sur 
l’origine légale et d’autres variables de La Porta et al. Nous mettons en 
évidence les spécificités des pays en développement ayant hérité de la loi 
française (par rapport à celles du droit anglais). Une réflexion sur le pouvoir 
politique et l’Etat trouve un fort contraste entre le modèle idéal-typique de 
la loi française et les résultats empiriques. Ce contraste est conforme à l’état 
réel de la notion plutôt que dans les anciennes colonies françaises.
Mots-clés: traditions juridiques, le développement, la colonisation.
Classification JEL: B52, F54, O52.
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Economic outcomes of legal institutions have been 
central in the work of John R. Commons (1924) 
and other institutional economists (John Maurice 
Clark, 1926). This issue has undergone a long 
period of eclipse before returning to the front of 
the stage since the 1990’s. Under the influence 
of the diffusion of New Institutional Economics 
(notably: North 1990), the economic importance 
of institutions is nowadays widely recognized in 
economic theory (Greif, 2006). Confidence 
in property rights, as key devices for securing 
transactions, enforcement of contracts, long-term 
expectations and the appropriation of investment 
returns, as well as guarantees against legal or 
illegal infringe mentor taking of private property 
rights by the State, are nowadays considered 
central to achieve economic performance 
(Cross, 2002); the growth of economic activities 
conducted within the sphere of legality and 
downsizing informal sector become sources of 
capital accumulation and exit from poverty in the 
Third World (De Soto, 2005). 
Indeed since mid-1990’s economists have 
developed a huge series of stimulating analysis 
of legal and political institutions, aiming at 
assessing their determinants and their impact on 
economic performance. In this framework, are 
now brought to the forefront the legal traditions 
of nations, particularly Anglo-American common 
law, and systems following the Roman-Germanic 
tradition, known as civil law systems (Glaeser & 
Shleifer, 2002; Djankov et al., 2003). Finally, the 
effects of colonization have become an important 
focus in analysis of economic, legal and political 
institutions in developing and emerging countries 
(Acemoglo et al., 2001).
A clear-cut idea emerges from the literature on 
legal origins and comparative analysis of legal 
systems: common law systems are characterized 
by low codification of law and an important 
contribution of case-law to the production of 
legal rules. They are supposed to be more able 
to facilitate and support to facilitate growth than 
civil law systems, which are characterized by the 
statutory and regulatory law and a minor role of 
courts. Civil law countries have a tendency to 
regulate through statute law and administrative 
regulations, while those who belong to the 
Anglo-American law tradition would be 
characterized by a moderate production of 
laws and regulations and greater political and 
economic freedoms.
This paper aims at contributing to the debates 
on the institutional features of developing 
countries or countries which have reached 
intermediate level of development, in terms 
of the consequences of the colonial legacy, 
specifically of the legal tradition inherited from 
the former colonial powers. The following study 
is at the interface of law, politics and economics, 
since the proposed approach is based on 
a comprehensive approach which aims at 
understandingnot a specific institution, but 
instead a nexus of political, legal and economic 
institutions and their mutual relations. The 
empirical basis used is the latest version (2009) 
of the “institutional profiles” database (IPD) set-
up by the French Ministry of Economy (DGTPE) 
and the French Development Agency (AFD).
Section 1 briefly reviews the recent literature on 
the origins of law and analysis of the colonial 
question. It will define the purpose of this paper. 
Section 2 presents preliminary results of the 
IPD exploitation on institutional profiles of 92 
countries. Section 3 examines the distinctive 
features of the countries formerly colonised 
by continental European countries of civil law 
tradition versus the British Empire.
INTRODUCTION 
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Understanding the current structure of political, 
legal and economic institutions in developing 
countries deserves to combine the analysis of 
“legal origins” and the colonial origins. We 
consider they are complementary, in so far as 
the type of colonization (commercial, imperial 
of indirect or indirect, of settlement of political 
domination and economic) experienced by 
developing countries is not neutral from the view 
point of legal and political institutions legacy.
1.1 LEGAL ORIGINS
The “Legal Origins” theory must be credited for 
having renewed the approach to the relationship 
between institutions and economic performance, 
focusing on legal systems. In this context, two main 
paths are followed: a) detailed analysis of the 
characteristics of legal systems, such as rules of civil 
procedure applicable to proceedings before a civil 
court (Djankov et al., 2003), b) linking characteristics 
of the legal system with the government, that is to 
say, the structure of political power and the State 
(La Porta et al. 1999, 2004). This latter approach 
renews the analysis of the determinants and impact 
on economic growth of both political institutions 
and structure of the government.
The pioneering work of Barro (2000) focused on the 
one hand on civil liberties and political rights –i.e. 
the level of democracy– and the other on the quality 
of government defined in terms of “Rule of Law”, 
in other words the ability of the State to provide 
social order, security of transactions and to establish 
efficient and uncorrupted administration officials. 
Barro has estimated the effects of colonization on 
access to a democratic political system and rule of 
law. We will return later to that issue.
The two fold issue of the colonial legacy and the 
quality of government has been deepened by 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
who connected it with legal tradition. Linking 
law and politics was a first contribution to the 
quantitative measurement of the contribution of 
the legal systems of common law and civil law 
to growth (Mahoney, 2000). This first empirical 
analysis, based on an Hayekian representation 
of legal systems and their relations with the State, 
argued that the common law –as a decentralized 
judicial law system– is similar to a spontaneous 
order ensuring higher level of freedoms and 
control of government that the so-called 
rationalist and constructivist Napoleonic legal 
systems. Huge structural differences separate 
legal systems: the common law countries grant 
the judiciary greater independence than civil 
law countries which, in turn, allowed the State 
greater power to interfere with private property 
and contractual rights which would be allowed 
in common law systems. Therefore, common 
law countries giving more freedom for citizens 
and civil society, they would experience stronger 
economic growth.
Econometric estimates made by Mahoney of 
102 countries over the period 1960-1992 
aimed at explaining the growth rate of GDP per 
capita by belonging to the common law or civil 
law show that:
“The common law countries have grown by an 
average 0.64% faster than those of civil law,
The average contract-intensive money ratio is 
higher in common law countries (0.81 against 
0.75)”1.
1.  STATING THE PROBLEM. A BRIEF REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
1 Mahoney has achieved a measure of the Contract Intensive Money indicator developed by Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson 
(1999) defined as the ratio M2-C/M2: (C = currency outside banks). The ratio reflects levels of confidence in the contracts: 
with the Government, that deposits are repaid, the payments are cleared, and with the idea that money in the bank is 
investable long-term holders of development, while cash holdings are allocated to short-term investments.
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“This first empirical 
analysis, based on an 
Hayekian representation 
of  legal systems and their 
relations with the State, 
argued that the common law 
–as a decentralized judicial 
law system– is similar to a 
spontaneous order ensuring 
higher level of  freedoms and 
control of  government that 
the so-called rationalist and 
constructivist Napoleonic 
legal systems.”
Mahoney’s conclusion is clear-cut: common law 
is more compatible with long-term growth that civil 
law, for reasons that mainly relate to protections 
of individual freedoms and property rights against 
State and political interference. Indeed, he argues 
that while civil law countries provides incentives 
to rent-seeking and redistribution through the 
influence of interest groups within the State, 
common law countries have institutional features 
which prevents such pressures on politics and 
administration to happen. However, it is worth 
noting that some important works are on the edge 
of the legal and political, and that the question 
of law may be closely linked to that of the State, 
administration and governance Public2.
1.2 COLONIAL LEGACY
Colonial legacy can be approximated by a series of 
qualitative indicators on the quality of government 
and governance, political risk, security of property 
rights and guarantees against expropriation by 
the State. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) have highlighted the diversity of political 
colonization by European countries and their 
effects on institutions and economic performance. 
Taking as an indicator of the nature of the colonial 
relationship mortality of early settlers, Acemoglu et 
al. infer the characteristics of the initial and then 
contemporary institutions. The timing and spatial 
extent chosen are wide, because they include 
former settlements of new countries (USA, Australia) 
where specific historical conditions have created 
new, original and specific institutions. The position 
of the colonies of European countries during the 
imperialist era in Africa and Asia is different: when 
the local conditions were too difficult to allow 
a sustainable settlement colonization, colonial 
policy consisted to establish an “extractive state” 
transferring the profits of natural resources and 
human resources to Europe.
2 In another perspective, the colonial phenomenon has 
been linked to the propensity change the constitution 
and political system (presidential vs. parliamentary) after 
countries access to independence (Hayo & Voigt, 2010).
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“The structure of  political 
power, since it configures the 
economic institutions, affects 
the distribution of  resources 
and equilibrium of  economic 
institutions. Control of  
political power becomes a 
central issue for the interest 
groups involved.”
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2004) show how 
international differences in endogenous economic 
institutions (that is to say, the structure of property 
rights and market prevalence and perfection) 
are the fundamental cause of differences in 
development. Economic institutions being the 
outcome of collective choice, when interest groups 
do not have homogeneous preferences, their 
setting-up is decided by political power holders. 
The structure of political power, since it configures 
the economic institutions, affects the distribution 
of resources and equilibrium of economic 
institutions. Control of political power becomes 
a central issue for the interest groups involved. 
Two types of political power are distinguished: 
de jure (institutionalized) power which defines 
the political institutions, the form of government, 
and the constraints that apply on the actions 
of leaders and political elite; de facto power, 
exerted by interest groups who, although not 
formally recognized, have a significant influence 
on economic institutions through the State. The 
source of de facto power is economic, because 
it concerns the resources available to influential 
groups; their control or influence over political 
power has implications for economic institutions 
and the distribution of future resources. 
Acemoglu et al. (2004) test this framework on 
two experimental cases: the division of Korea 
into two states of very different nature, then the 
colonial experience. The latter is analyzed as a 
historically “setback”: why did the rich nations in 
the 15th century (for examples Incas and Aztecs 
Empires) have fastly declined (due to initial 
choice of colonization) and created inefficient 
institutions, while less developed nations at the 
start (North America, Australia, New Zealand) 
have become settlement colonies with political 
and economic institutions promoting wealth? 
The explanation lies in the initial conditions 
of population and urbanization: the regions 
originally populated and urbanized had the 
worst institutions and, conversely, initially 
under-populated regions and sub-urban with 
colonization of European settlement have 
developed better institutions. In the first case, 
the settlement put in place a system of wealth 
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extraction through the exploitation of sub-soil, 
natural resources, labor (through forced labor) 
and economic resources (through taxation) for 
the benefit of the European colonial country. In 
the second case, the structure of property, the 
definition of and respect for private property 
rights were directed towards the development of 
efficient institutions. 
One must notice that neither the identity of the 
colonial power, if their culture or religion explain 
the differences of institutions and economic 
development.
North, Wallis and Weingast (2006) combine 
political theory and economic analysis in a 
model of development process in (very) long 
period based on the conditions of social order 
and control of violence. They make a distinction 
between limited access social orders and open 
access social orders. The former ensure social 
stability which is a condition for production 
specialization and exchange, on the basis of 
regulation of entries in economic activity and rent 
creation which are at their turn sources of political 
and social stability. The latter ensure freedom to 
access to economic or political organizations and 
provide social stability on the basis of economic 
and political competition. The argument of North 
et al. is that economic and social development in 
the modern era was the result of a substitution of 
an open access social to the formerly prevailing 
limited access order, which supported rent-
distribution processes legitimating and stabilizing 
political power instead of providing incentives to 
economic efficiency.
A variant of this thesis is provided by Meisel and 
Ould Aoudia (2007) who argue that most of 
the problems of bad governance and structural 
poverty in developing countries is attributable to 
the predominance of a political power captured 
by an “insider system”. They define the “insider 
system” in these terms: “the economic and political 
elites who share at their own benefit access to 
key resources (power, information, wealth, ...)” 
that set up a system of inefficient regulation 
(distribution ofrents), short-term approach, unfair 
and rigid and inequitable since “equilibria are not 
guaranteed by rules recognized by all”.
2. INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES OF FORMER COLONIES  
As stated in section 1, colonial legacy has 
become a central issue in economic analysis 
of relations between growth and institutions 
and poverty reduction in developing countries. 
Conceptual models, crossing political and 
legal dimensions of institutions and economic 
performance, suggests that the colonial 
legacy of the country under British rule is more 
conducive to long-term growth, improved 
quality of property rights, high level of security 
of transactions, than the former French, 
Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese colonies, at 
least as regards the nations which gained there 
independent in the years 1950-1960. 
The two main problems posed by the French civil 
law tradition is that the State over-regulates and 
encourages too little economic activity but also that 
the model of government and public institutions 
encourages rent-seeking and capture of State 
rather than investment in physical capital or human 
capital. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2004) 
argue that the distribution of political power affects 
the power structure and the distribution of resources, 
directing towards rents and redistribution, or to 
property rights and investment.
The following discussion will seek to cross the 
question of the colonial legacy and the legal 
system from the IPD 2009 database.
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2.1 DEVELOPMENT: A LONG-TERM 
PROCESS OF DEPERSONALIZATION 
OF SOCIAL REGULATION SYSTEMS
Meisel and Ould Aoudia, initiators of the IPD 
database with its three surveys (2001, 2004, 2009) 
put the emphasis on the limits of development 
approaches in terms of “good governance”. They 
argue that this concept does not take into account 
the interdependencies between institutions and 
the reasons why, at the same level of quality 
of governance, countries enter a process of 
sustained growth while others do not. Meisel 
and Ould Aoudia propose the concept of “focal 
point of governance” from the experience of 
countries that have experienced steady long-term 
growth. These countries are characterized by their 
ability to create key organizations, to coordinate 
groups of dominant interests, to ensure security 
of expectations and to provide conditional 
incentives; these capacities allow overcoming the 
shortcomings of both formal mechanisms of trust 
and traditional/informal regulations. 
It is important to note that, for them, the development 
process can be analyzed as a mechanism of 
depersonalization systems of social regulation, 
in a sense whichcould be described in Weberian 
terms of formal-bureaucratic rationalization; data 
analysis reveals two key factors:
Mechanisms of provision of trust, which oscillate 
between a largely informal mode, generating 
interpersonal trust (similar to Durkheim’s organic 
solidarity) and a formal and interpersonal model, 
based on written law and generating “systemic 
trust” (close to Durkheim’s mechanic solidarity).
The way the State operates in the economy, 
whose ways are extreme dictatorship on the one 
hand, anomy on the other, and whose presence 
produces growth and development is associated 
with the setting-up of future-orientated institutions 
(coordination of actors and expectations, 
education, R &D ...).
The role of the State may be related to modes 
of production of trust in society in different 
institutional settings: on the one hand, richer 
countries provide institutional social regulation, 
through formal mechanisms which operation is 
not dependent upon interpersonal relations but 
instead relies on abstract, general and rational-
bureaucratic categories. On the other, poorest 
countries are characterized by the prevalence 
of traditional mechanisms of solidarity and 
regulation, which can either take precedence over 
State or result from Statefailures in terms of spatial 
or social extension. We will return to this point later. 
Finally, the relationship between formal rules and 
depersonalization is not unambiguous: in some 
cases, the introduction of formally rationalized 
rules is a seemingly content. In this case the State 
is notional, since the formal rules are not widely 
implemented in the social regulation, which 
remains based on traditional relations, such as 
ethnic solidarity, tribal, or regionally implemented 
in a political-economic clientelist pattern.
Figure 1. A preliminary insight into the IPD 
database: principal component analysis. 
Source: Meisel et Ould-Aoudia, 2007, p. 13.
Figure 1 illustrates the above analysis. On the left 
side of the horizontal axis are developing countries 
whose level of formalization of rules is low, whereas 
on the right side are the rich countries that have 
highly formalized systems of social regulation. On 
the vertical axis at the bottom poor countries where 
the failures in the State are evident, and the top 
countries marked by a strong presence, including 
authoritarian and repressive State.
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“... poorest countries are 
characterized by the prevalence 
of  traditional mechanisms 
of  solidarity and regulation, 
which can either take 
precedence over State or 
result from Statefailures 
in terms of  spatial or 
social extension.”
2.2 LEGAL ORIGINS AND 
INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES 
Meisel and Ould Aoudia’s analysis does not 
take into account the legal systems; however 
the latter are crucial from several points of view: 
the institutional balance of powers that the legal 
traditions –at least their ideal-typus – carry; the 
model of State, between a centralized state and 
an executive / presidential and decentralized state 
or facing significative parliamentary or judicial 
checks and balances. Finally, legal systems matter 
owing to the consequences of colonial control and 
institutional legacy left to the former colonies when 
they were granted their political independence.
We use the institutional profiles 2009 database 
(2 digits), which includes 93 variables on public 
institutions and civil society (A), the market for 
goods and services (B), the capital market (C), 
the market Labour (D) in 123 countries. IDP data 
have been supplemented by additional variables 
of the legal tradition (English, French, German 
and Scandinavian) borrowed to Shleifer et al. by 
and economic data (GNP per capita and GNP 
per capita growth from 1960 to 2000). Our study 
focusing on developing countries, we have excluded 
the OECD countries. The following study therefore 
concerns 92 countries which distribution according 
to the origin of law is presented in Table 1.
The IPD data are collected from “economic 
missions” of the French embassies abroad and 
seek to capture de facto institutional characteristics 
rather than de jure, i.e. institutional functions instead 
of their forms. In the 3 digits version, IPD includes 
356 elementary items, on political institutions and 
civil liberties, the market for goods and services, 
capital market and the labor market, in a structure 
designed to maximize the information gathered. 
9 themes cut across the 4 areas identified: : (1) 
public institutions, (2) Security, law and order, 
(3) functioning of public administrations, (4) 
free operation of markets, (5) Coordination of 
Stakeholders and Strategic visions, (6) Security of 
Transactions and Contracts, (7) Market regulation, 
Social Dialogue, (8) Openness to the Outside 
World, (9) Social Cohesion.
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Table 1. Country distribution according to legal origins.
Legal Origin N Countries
French Law (Legor Fr) 64 AGO, ARE, ARG, AZE, BEN, BFA, BOL, BRA, CAF, CIV, CMR, COG, COL, CUB, 
CYP, DOM, DZA, ECU, EGY, ETH, GAB, GTM, HND, HTI, IDN, IRN, JOR, KAZ, 
KHM, KWT, LAO, LBN, LBY, LTU, MAR, MDG, MLI, MLT, MOZ, MRT, MUS, NER, 
NIC, OMN, PAN, PER, PHL, PRY, QAT, ROM, RUS, SEN, SYR, TCD, TGO, TUN, 
UKR, URY, UZB, VEN, VNM, YEM, YUG, ZAR
British Law (Legor Uk) 22 BGD, BHR, BWA, GHA, HKG, IND, KEN, LKA, MYS, NAM, NGA, NPL, PAK, SAU, 
SDN, SGP, THA, TZA, UGA, ZAF, ZMB, ZWE
German Law (Legor GE) 6 BGR, CHN, EST, LVA, MNG, TAI
A principal component analysis on the 93 
variables shows how the variables are ordered 
by factorial axis. Table 2 shows the variables 
whose contribution is greater than 0.35 and their 
coordinates on the first two axis.
Table 2. Factorial analysis: variables which contribution to the inerty exceeds 0.35                                   
(47 variables – 92 countries)
Label Variable Axis 1 Axis 2
Democracy, Legality and Freedom Democr -0,60 -0,65
Political stability and Legitimacy Polstab -0,69 0,03
Decentralization Decentr -0,51 -0,41
Domestic public security and Control of violence public secur -0,54 0,35
Governance of public administration and the justice system Gouv adm & justice -0,90 0,03
Donors influence donors influence 0,43 -0,42
Autonomy in operation and creation of organizations Autonomy org -0,38 -0,82
Government capacity to reform Gvt capacity reform -0,67 0,32
Capacity of the state to coordinate stakeholders Gvt capacity coord stake -0,60 0,29
Strategic capacities Strategic capacity -0,78 0,44
Government’s arbitration capacity Gvt arbitration capacity -0,39 0,56
Institutional capacity Instit capacity -0,65 0,18
Government political capacity Gvt pol capacity -0,49 0,13
Change, innovation Change -0,83 -0,02
Security of transactions and contracts Secur contract -0,90 -0,07
National cohesion National cohes -0,52 0,28
Social inclusion social inclusion -0,81 0,24
Subsidies on commodities Subs commod 0,31 0,46
Ease of starting a business Ease start bus -0,67 -0,06
Consideration of public interest in government-business relations Public int in Gvt-private -0,51 0,37
Technological environment techno env -0,76 0,15
Public aid for R&D public aid RD -0,64 0,23
Density of sub-contracting relations Density sub-contrac -0,69 0,00
Information on G&S markets info G&S markets -0,88 -0,06
Rural land tenure: traditional property rural land trad property 0,46 -0,32
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Label Variable Axis 1 Axis 2
Diversity of land tenure rights systems diversity land tenure -0,51 0,03
Government recognition of diversity of land tenure rights systems gvt recogni diversity land tenure -0,58 0,02
Land tenure: security of ownership land security owner -0,78 0,07
Competition on G&S markets competition G&S mark -0,86 -0,02
Land tenure: development policies land tenure dev policy -0,59 0,36
Competence of bank executives competence bank exec -0,58 -0,10
Importance of venture capital importance venture cap -0,56 -0,01
Financial information Finan info -0,65 -0,34
Regulation of competition in banking regul competition bank -0,66 -0,16
Monitoring and auditing in banking monitor audit bank -0,73 -0,25
Adaptive education system adaptative educ syst -0,73 0,10
Respect for workers rights Workers rights -0,59 -0,25
Management of labour labour manag -0,54 -0,30
Quality of public education and health care Quality prov educ health -0,70 0,24
Low incidence of child labour Lab child low -0,66 0,28
Social mobility social mobil -0,68 -0,24
Legal Origin: French legor_fr 0,30 0,05
Legal Origin: English legor_uk -0,15 -0,02
Legal Origin: German legor_ge -0,30 -0,07
Index of judicial independence - La Porta et al. 2004 - Judicial 
checks and balances - Journal of Political Economy. Judicial indep -0,86 -0,16
Average corruption score over the period 1996 through 2000 - 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp corrup control -0,70 0,19
Shleifer- Balance power -0,53 -0,41
Figure 2 provides an image of “halo of institutions’ 
consistent with that of Meisel and Ould-Aoudia 
(2007).
The first factorial axis (which explains nearly 
36% of the inertia) is divided by the level of 
depersonalization of social regulation system, 
which is described here in terms of degree of 
formalization of rules. The left side of axis 1 
refers to countries that have set-up a high quality 
institutional system of social regulation, which 
provides transparency in markets of goods and 
services and capital. They also ensure the rights 
guaranteed to employees in the labor market. A 
high level of social cohesion is linked to the ability 
to reform carried by the State and its position 
as an institution able to implement a strategic 
vision regarding the future. The right side of axis 
1 is divided between subsidies to commodities 
The analysis of correlations between the 47 active 
variables presented in the table above confirms 
the value of IPD in terms of the multiplication of 
measured items (see fig. 2).
Figure 2. Correlations between active 
variables (2 digits, 47 variables).
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and traditional structures of rural land tenure. 
The vertical axis is slightly different from that 
Meisel and Ould-Aoudia highlighted: while 
they oppose a strong State to anomy vis-à-vis 
public institutions, Figure 2 shows an opposition 
between a strong State involvement in society on 
the one hand, and arbitration between internal 
liberties, economic and political dependence vis-
à-vis foreign donors, who have an influence on 
domestic public policy.
The variables “legal origins” have a differential 
significance. While the inheritance of English law 
(Legor-UK) and German (Legor-GE) are on the left 
(associated to high level of formalization of rules) 
of axis 1, French law is clearly distinguishable on 
the right side, connected to weak formal social 
regulation, and low levels of depersonalization of 
regulation. We can deduce, correspondingly, a 
large weight of traditional solidarity.
The matrix of correlations between variables 
(see appendix), here restricted to those on public 
institutions and civil society, but supplemented 
by the origin of law variables, level of GNP per 
capita and GDP growth per capita from 1960 to 
2000, confirms that the legacy of French law is 
distinctive. The correlations of the variable “French 
law origin” (Legor-FR) with a range of other 
variables are negative: democracy, governance 
and administration of justice, strategic capabilities 
of the state, institutional capacity of State, security 
of transactions and contracts. Correlations of 
variables of legal origins in English law and 
German law show positive (however weak) 
coefficients with the previous variables. This 
observation calls the plausible hypothesis of a 
greater neutrality of English and German law as 
compared to French law in the construction of 
institutional systems of social control. It must be 
stressed that the latter does not distinguish between 
former colonial powers, as are aggregated into 
this category France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal 
and the Netherlands. However, historians of 
colonization, especially sub-Saharan Africa, 
have shown that models of colonial domination 
in those countries of Europe are not uniform. We 
shall return to this issue below.
An additional observation can be done (Figure 
3) which represents the countries included in the 
analysis.
Figure 3. Institutional profiles - non-OECD countries (92 countries).
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“The relationship between 
quality of  governance and 
administration of  justice 
with the long-term growth, 
as measured by the growth 
of  GNP per capita between 
1960 and 2000, shows a 
positive relationship for all 
countries, without one can 
infer causality: is the quality 
of  public institutions a 
condition of  growth, or the 
consequence of  growth?”
The southeast quadrant represent countries 
whose institutional profiles are marked by failures 
of social regulation by formalized rules, a discreet 
presence of the State and public institutions, and 
high dependency vis-à-vis donors of funds. There 
are mainly former French colonies in North Africa 
and Sub-Saharan Africa (Morocco, Senegal, 
Ivory Coast, Niger, Madagascar, Chad, Togo, 
Mali, Mauritania, Cameroon ...) who actually 
inherited the French modellegal and, beyond 
him, its State model. However, all countries in 
this category are not former French colonies. 
Some former British colonies (such as Uganda, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Nepal) share 
similar institutional characteristics with previous 
countries. This suggests that there is no reason to 
consider any determinism, or at least unequivocal 
relation between the legacy of English common 
law and a specific institutional profile compared 
to that of former French, Dutch (Indonesia) or 
Spanish (Paraguay, Ecuador) colonies.
The relationship between quality of governance 
and administration of justice with the long-term 
growth, as measured by the growth of GNP per 
capita between 1960 and 2000, shows a positive 
relationship for all countries, without one can 
infer causality: is the quality of public institutions a 
condition of growth, or the consequence of growth? 
Literature rather supports the first hypothesis: the 
establishment of the Rule of Law (Barro, 2000), 
the quality of government (La Porta et al., 1999) or 
political and administrative power, but modernizing 
authoritarian and supportive of economic planning 
out of poverty as South Korea in the 1960s (La Porta 
et al., 2004) are significant predictors of continued 
and sustained long term growth. 
In Figure 4, the quality of the governance and 
administration of justice refers to transparency 
and “readability” of economic policies, control of 
corruption, efficiency of the tax system, transparency 
in government procurement, efficiency of justice 
and efficiency of urban governance. The figure 
relates the indicator of quality of administration 
and justice and growth of GNP per capita from 
1960 to 2000, distinguishing between two legal 
origins (French and English). In both cases the 
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La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches and 
Shleifer (2004) argue that among the institutions 
guaranteeing freedom –defined as absence of 
coercion of government–, the principle of checks 
and balances is crucial. It cannot be analyzed 
outside constitutions3. Their analytical framework 
is directly inspired by the Hayekian theory and 
Anglo-American constitutional system of balance 
between executive, legislative, and judiciary: The 
judiciary can limit the other powers by either an 
independent administration of justice or the judicial 
review of statute law and public policy provisions.
Their econometric analysis of the constitutional 
provisions relating to judicial independence 
and constitutional review in 71 countries aims 
at answering a fundamental question: are they 
related to the economic and political freedom? 
The first is measured by the security of property 
rights (including the risk of expropriation by the 
State), weak government regulation, and the 
modesty of public ownership. The second is 
measured by the level of democracy, political 
rights and human rights. Justice is considered 
relationship is positive, but is more pronounced 
for English law countries as compared to those 
who inherited the French law, although in both 
cases the coefficient of determination (R2) is 
relatively low.
This slight difference between the French law and 
English law countries in relation to long-term 
growth deserves attention, taking into account the 
problem of the scope of the State and the balance 
of powers, i.e. relations between the judiciary and 
the executive.
2.3  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
CHECkS AND BALANCES
The “judicial checks and balances” and 
“constitutional review” issues are central in 
economic analysis of legal origins (La Porta et al., 
2004). It again shows the relationship between 
the legal and political structures, i.e. the model of 
State and relations between the executive and the 
judiciary which sets the framework of interaction 
between civil society and State.
Figure 4. Gouvernance of administration & justice quality and GDP growth per capita, 1960-2000
3 See the definition of the Encyclopedia Britannica: “principle of government under which separate branches are empowered to 
preventive action by other branches and are induced to share power” (La Porta et al., 2004, p. 446).
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as a safeguard against excessive powers of the 
executive and legislative branches, which may 
be the subject of coalitions and interest groups 
that shape laws and public policies to satisfy 
their own interests and reelection of the ruling 
political group rather than the public interest and 
disinterested guarantee of property rights and 
political freedom.
The purpose of justice is to ensure the political 
and economic freedoms, since a high degree 
of independence of the judiciary guarantees the 
impartiality of judges in disputes between litigants 
and the government (for instance in takings 
issues) and where the existence of a mechanism 
of “constitutional review” is a safeguard against 
legislation directed towards the satisfaction of 
clientelist interests or groups controlling the State. 
The conclusion of La Porta et al. (2004) is that: 
“Consistent with the hypothesis of Hayek and 
others, we find that both judicial independence 
and constitutional review are strong predictors 
of freedom. We find that judicial independence 
is important for both kinds of freedom, whereas 
constitutional review matters for political freedom” 
(La Porta et al., 2004, p. 448).
This thesis cannot escape criticism, including the fact 
that judicial independence is taken from a narrow 
perspective and that an alternative path could be 
considered a bundle of institutional characteristics 
rather than a general and broad conception of 
sources of law and judicial independence. For 
example, Hadfield (2008) argues that judicial 
independence cannot be validly measured by 
a very small number of indicators (such as: is 
case law or not a source of law; regulation of 
judges career) but should be assessed through a 
series of data relating to a high number of key 
characteristics of judicial activity: organization of 
the legal profession, court organization and skills, 
distribution of legal information, enforcement 
mechanisms, organization of the legal services 
market, cost of suits.
If the dichotomy between common law and civil law 
is convenient for econometric estimates purpose, 
it actually conceals a more complex and rich 
institutional landscape about the effects of a legal 
regime on economic activity and social welfare 
(Hadfield, 2008; Klerman & Mahoney, 2007).
The issue at stake is now is to clarify the 
relationship between the measured level of 
judicial independence, of State impartiality, and 
security of contracts and transactions. The first 
question raises the issue of whether the weakness 
of judicial independence is correlated with a high 
level of corruption of State officials and/or civil 
servants. The second is whether the independence 
of justice is linked to greater security of contracts 
and transactions.
An independent judiciary, in which the Supreme 
Court Judges (in judicial and administrative 
matters) are appointed for life, or for over 6 years, 
and case-law is a recognized as a genuine source 
of law, ensures the absence of interference of the 
executive power in how judges decide ensures 
fairness of treatment of citizens in conflict with 
the Government, especially in terms of takings of 
private property and public contracts. Ultimately, 
an independent judiciary is an institution 
guaranteeing private property rights.
Figure 5 shows that countries with a high level of 
control of corruption and judicial independence 
have a high level of social cohesion, provision 
of public health and education services, strategic 
capabilities of the State, and belong rather to 
German law and English law. French law countries 
are characterized by a couple of low level of both 
judicial independence and control of corruption.
The second question, i.e. the relationship between 
judicial independence and security of transactions 
and contracts, raises practical issues such as: 
is judicial independence a guarantee against 
expropriation of private property rights, non-
enforcement of contracts, termination of contracts 
with the Gouvernment? Figure 6 shows the results 
of a bivariate analysis on these variables.
We see again that belonging to French law differs 
from belonging to English and German law. The 
French legal legacy is negatively correlated with 
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Figure 5. Bivariate analysis 1: judicial independence and control of corruption.
Figure 6. Bivariate analysis 2: judicial independence and security of contracts and transactions.
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these variables (Security of contracts and judicial 
independance), whereas English law is positive, 
albeit low (Table 3).
Ultimately, the correlations of the legal origin with 
the level of wealth, long-term growth, control of 
corruption, judicial independence and checks 
and balances in the public sphere confirm the 
trends noted earlier: the English and German 
legal traditions are correlated with these variables 
in a different sense of the French legal one (tab 
4). French law countries are growing more 
sluggish, implement less control of corruption 
of political elites and government officials have 
a more limited level of independence of justice, 
and do not provide checks and balances to the 
executive. Also note that the English legal tradition 
is negatively correlated with the level of GDP per 
capita, indicating that the British colonial legacy 
has been marked by less economic investment of 
Britain in its colonial empire as did France in its 
African and Asian colonies.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: relation between security of contracts and judicial independence. 
Variable N Weight Mean Std-error
Correlation with: 
Security Contracts
Correlation with:
Judicial Independance
French Law 92 92,00 0,67 0,47 -0,27 -0,27
English Law 92 92,00 0,26 0,44 0,19 0,13
German Law 92 92,00 0,07 0,25 0,18 0,28
Table 4. Legal origins - Summary of correlations (92 non OECD countries).
Correlation with variables: Legal Origin:English Law
Legal Origin:
French law
Legal Origin:
German Law
Log GDP per capita 2000 -0.21 0.10 0.19
Growth GDP per capita 1960-2000 0.16 -0.20 0.10
Control of corruption 0.12 -0.18 0.12
Judicial independance 0.13 -0.27 0.28
Balance powers 0.15 -0.28 0.25
3. DISCUSSION 
The following discussion addresses two related 
issues: 1) what are the reasons of a specific 
institutional profile of French law countries?, and 
2) is legal origin the sole factor explaining the 
specifies for the latter? As previously in the paper, 
the following analysis uses simple descriptive 
tools. Our intent is to provide insights into the 
issues raised through data analysis and descriptive 
statistical analysis. 
3.1 HOW TO ExPLAIN THE 
INSTITUTIONAL PROFILE OF 
FRENCH LAW COUNTRIES?
The institutional model left in the former colonies 
by European countries, primarily France, is 
characterized by a strong executive taking the form 
of a presidential system rather than parliamentary, 
a centralized State and a hypertrophied 
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“Developing countries 
having inherited the legacy of  
French law are characterized 
by poor public governance 
and, correspondingly, the 
existence of  social regulation 
mechanisms as palliative of  
failures of  the State, and 
strong external dependence 
notably in sub-saharian 
African nations.”
administration, statute law as a primary source of 
law, the vocation of the State to provide public 
goods and social benefits, so as to ensure social 
cohesion by means of socialized management 
of social risks (unemployment, sickness, aging) 
funded by taxes or social contributions. In addition, 
the State is regulatory and carries a vision of the 
future through central planning policies or the 
ability to mobilize expertise and foresight to bring 
them into discussion with social partners. These 
characteristics correspond to the ideal typus of 
legal model introduced in France after the 1789 
French Revolution and, especially, the creation of 
Napoleonic institutions.
However, the institutional profiles of the former 
French colonies do not fit this pattern, but rather 
its opposite: the prevalence of traditional solidarity 
and a strong resilience of traditional practices 
of rural land tenure, which may be considered 
paradoxical. The paradox can be lifted by 
considering the capture of the State by social 
groups who control it for clientelist redistribution of 
public resources, and lack of penetration in depth 
of the administration and institutions public in the 
construction of impersonal institutions of social 
regulation to the benefit the greatest number.
Developing countries having inherited the legacy 
of French law are characterized by poor public 
governance and, correspondingly, the existence 
of social regulation mechanisms as palliative 
of failures of the State, and strong external 
dependence notably in sub-saharian African 
nations. All this gives the image of a “notional 
state” as described by Bromley (2008), which 
refers to the idea of a spatial concentration of the 
state in the major cities: “The State is notional… 
because it does not reach the citizens beyond the 
capital city” (Bromley, 2008, p. 13). For instance, 
a working paper of the Ministry of Finance of 
Morocco in 1988 outlined that institutional 
social protection has a narrow scope, since the 
National Social Security Fund covers 24% of 
the employed population in urban areas; the 
whole set of retirement funds benefit to only 
26% of the workforce employed at the national 
level. The same report notes that: “The family 
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is the first system of social protection. It is the 
only protection for the unemployed and social 
exclusion” (Ministry of Economy and Finance of 
the Kingdom of Morocco, 1998, p. 2).
The constitutional lawyer Milhat considers 
that “a more refined analysis would lead to 
conclude that state even formally exist in Africa” 
–it exists “constitutionally –which mean that in 
practice–” does not exist “in its functioning” 
(Milhat, 2004, p. 62).
Unlike the colonies which inherited French 
law, the British heritage demonstrates greater 
neutrality on current institutional profiles. Having 
been dominated under British rule does not seem 
to have narrowed the range of possibilities of 
institutional and economic evolution in former 
colonies. A plausible reason for this is that the 
English domination with its “indirect rule” policy 
has been less (des)structuring in the colonies. 
Historians of Africa Coquery-Vidrovitch and 
Moniot (1984) compare the effects, in their 
opinion of minor difference for the African people, 
of the assimilation policy of France and indirect 
rule of the Great-Britain. They emphasis that “the 
only tangible differences, on the field, in the eyes 
of Africans, between assimilation and Indirect Rule 
were not probably neither economic nor political 
but cultural: cultural imperialism French opposed 
the slogan of the British have to respect the 
integrity of traditional values” (Coquery-Vidrovitch 
& Moniot, 1984, p. 182). Another authoritative 
historian of Africa, Elikia M’Bokolo, considers 
that “... the British government preferred to rely 
on traditional leaders whose hair she had only the 
power” (M’Bokolo, 1985, p. 137).
The process which granted the British colonies 
in Africa their independence differs from that of 
countries under French, Belgian, Spanish and 
Portuguese domination. The publication by the 
Labour government then in power in Great-
Britain (1948) of a Blue Book has set-up the 
process of transformation of the territories of 
the Empire into a “Commonwealth of Nations”: 
“This development should be done according 
to the same pattern: increasing the number 
of Africans in the Legislative and Executive 
Councils and the representative character 
of these Councils; granting of representative 
government and the election by the Legislative 
Council of a responsible government with full 
autonomy, independence, finally, if possible, 
keeping within the Commonwealth” (M’Bokolo, 
1985, p. 140).
The French colonial policy was a direct 
administration policy, granting a slow but 
progressive access to citizenship on a meritocratic 
basis, and aiming at “assimilation” of indigenous 
into the French canvass, to which has been 
added a proposed establishment of a Franco-
African Community when General de Gaulle 
returned to power in 1958 and proceeded to 
the constitutional reform that established the 
5th Republic. However aborted, the Franco-
African community resulted in the establishment 
of economic, cultural and military cooperation 
agreements between France and the vast majority 
of former African colonies.
Ultimately, France have left in its former colonies its 
governmental, administrative and judicial model 
(codified law, with dual jurisdiction: judicial and 
administrative), but only in part: all the attributes 
of French institutions have not transposed in the 
former African colonies, or have been introduced 
formally, without effective powers. The bodies of 
executive control such as Courts of Auditors (“cour 
des comptes”) and the Constitutional Council 
are not in Africa or elsewhere, independent vis-
à-vis the Government. In more general terms, 
State interventionism in the dominant colonial 
country (France but also Spain and Portugal), is 
the outcome of political, social and institutional 
history which led to checks and balances on the 
executive: a public accounting auditing entity 
vested with the status of a financial court, which 
performs its duties without being influenced by the 
Government, an administrative court deciding 
with impartiality conflicts between citizens and 
the Government, a Constitutional Council acting 
with independence on constitutional issues. 
However, the effectiveness of the mechanisms 
of executive control and, more generally, of 
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checks and balances, is not a systematically 
transferable feature from the former colonial 
countries to its former colonies. From this point 
of view, the model of Djankov et al. (2003) of 
institutional models of regulation echoes the 
preceding statements. Institutional arrangements 
prevailing in the former colonial nations (in their 
terms private ordering, independent judges, 
regulatory states, public property) can be efficient 
and appropriate in terms of trade-off between 
control of the State (takings, public expropriation 
of private property) and control of social violence 
(private expropriation) in their specific context; 
they however can be inefficient and inappropriate 
in another context, in particular in the context of 
colonial transposition of institutions. 
3.3 BEYOND LEGAL ORIGINS: 
COLONIAL HISTORY?
Distangling the impact of legal origins and 
colonial history on quality of institutions and 
economic outcome is a crucial issue recently 
raised by Klerman, Mahoney, Spamann, Weinstein 
(2010). Colonial history can be tackled from two 
viewpoints: sociological and political. The former 
is conducive to an analysis in terms of process of 
colonization: through settlement of europeans (for 
instance Algeria, South-Africa), as a dependancy 
of an imperalist developed country (for instance 
Lebanon and Syria regarding the “mandat” 
granted by the Society of Nations to France in 
the 1920’s), through a mix of political/military 
and ideological domination (former COMECON 
in Eastern Europe); the latter leads to put the 
emphasis on the political status of the dominated 
countries: as a colony or a dependency. 
Following Acemoglu et al., Klerman et al., the 
status of former colonies have been categorized 
as: dependencies, settlement colonies, never 
colonized, and former COMECON countries 
of eastern Europe. We prefer using the terms 
of sociological viewpoint; our categorization of 
countries is called “types of colony”.
Political viewpoint is tackled thought a 
categorization of countries as “political status”: 
Political Colony, Dependency, Independence.
Correlation between types of colonies and legal 
origins. The Table 5 shows that dependencies 
are positively correlated with British law legal 
origin, settlement colonies with French Law; never 
colonized countries and former COMECON 
members are positively correlated with german law. 
Coefficients of correlation in table 5 seem 
coherent with the previous statement according 
to which former colonies of U.K. were mainly 
dependencies where the indirect rule principle 
of local government applied, while the former 
colonies of continental european countries were 
mainly settlement colonies. 
Table 5. Correlations between types of colonies and legal origins.
 Type Col Dependency
Type 
Col 
Settle
Type Col 
Indepen-
dence
Type Col Former 
COMECON
French 
Law
English
Law
German 
Law
Col Dependency 1,00       
Col Settle -0,67 1,00      
Col Independance -0,23 -0,17 1,00     
Col Former 
COMECON -0,42 -0,18 -0,11 1,00    
French Law -0,15 0,19 -0,12 0,07 1,00   
English Law 0,26 -0,13 -0,01 -0,20 -0,85 1,00  
German Law -0,19 -0,12 0,24 0,22 -0,39 -0,15 1,00
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From the political viewpoint, colonies are 
categorized as: colonies stricto-sensu, 
dependancies (dominions), and independent 
(including former colonies which gained their 
independence long time ago). Table 6 shows 
that French law legal origin is correlated with 
colonies, while English law is correlated with 
dependencies.
However French Law is a generic category 
which deserves to be desaggregated regarding 
the identity of former colonial powers: France, 
Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Netherlands, and 
former Ottoman Empire. Table 7 shows how 
diverse were the colonial policies of european 
countries belonging to the French Law family.
Former colonies of Spain are mainly settlement 
colonies. However, almost all the former 
dominated territories gained their independence 
in the mid-19th century. 
Former colonies of France were not settlement 
colonies, with the exception of Algeria, but 
dependancies. This is close to the British colonial 
system from this point of view. 
Table 6. Correlations between political status of colonies and legal origins.
 Pol. Status Colony
Pol. Status 
Dependency
Pol. Status 
Indepedence
French 
Law
English 
Law
German 
Law
Political Status Colony 1,00      
Political Status Dependency -0,42 1,00     
Political Status Indepedence -0,58 -0,47 1,00    
French Law 0,14 -0,25 0,07 1,00   
English Law -0,04 0,30 -0,21 -0,85 1,00  
German Law -0,19 -0,05 0,24 -0,39 -0,15 1,00
Table 7. Correlations between types of colonies and former colonial power.
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Acemoglu et al., Klerman et al. find a positive 
correlation between settlement colonial policies 
and quality of institutions.
The Table 8 shows the matrix of correlations 
between a series of index of quality of institutions 
and the identity of the former colonial power. 
In a relative and comparative perspective, the 
former Spanish colonies exhibit better institutions 
as compared to former colonies controlled by 
France, Belgium, and England. Notice that 
correlations coefficients between Spain and 
Portuguese colonies are rather close. This can 
be interpreted in the following terms: most of the 
Spanish and Portuguese colonies gained their 
political independence long time ago (with the 
exceptions of African colonies) as compared to 
other countries in the South (in Africa and Asia). 
We support in part Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
Klerman et al. (2010) conclusions regarding the 
positive effect of settlement policies on the quality 
of institutions. We observe a convergent result 
form a descriptive viewpoint in the case of former 
colonies with Spanish settlers. This empirical 
result deserves some qualification because of 
former Spanish colonies in Latin America were 
granted early political independence in the 19th 
century while African and Asian colonies gained 
they autonomy around 1960. The sole genuine 
settlement colony of France, namely Algeria, is a 
specific case; most the former French and Belgium 
colonies were dependencies, even if a few number 
of Europeans were living there, as public officials, 
representatives of economic interests (firms) and a 
couple of executives in charge of the management 
of activity, and some farmers who were granted 
land for export-oriented crops. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we find greater (de)structuring effects 
of former colonization by French law countries 
on institutional profiles of developing countries 
as compared to those who have experienced 
British colonial rule and for a few cases, German 
domination. Legal traditions inherited from 
colonization do not seem to have affected in a 
symmetric way civil law countries and common 
law countries. This conclusion is likely to qualify 
the theory of systematic superiority of common 
law in terms of ability to overcome poverty and 
sustain long-term growth. It is however consistent 
with that of the limiting factors, and institutional 
policies, of other colonial legacies, namely that 
of French law and its model of articulation of the 
structure of political power and the judiciary.
The contrast between the ideal-typus of French 
law, combining State interventionist and 
Jacobinism, and the finding of correlations 
between the legacy of this legal tradition, the 
prevalence of traditional solidarity and de facto 
weakness of depersonalization and regulation 
social, can presumably be explained by the spatial 
concentration of the state and public institutions 
in cities, primarily the capital-city, corresponding 
to the figure of a “notional State” (Bromley, 2008 
) whose formal existence in the Constitution does 
not extend to the functional and spatial realities.
Finally, three limitations of this study must be 
reported. First, quantitative analysis of the IPD 
is descriptive and uses simple tools of data 
analysis, showing correlations between variables, 
but no systematic econometric and explanatory 
dimension have been implemented. Second, 
policy analysis, constitutional and historical forms 
of state structures and political power deserve 
to be expanded further. Third, the relationship 
between legal origins and colonial policies has 
been analyzed in an exploratory perspective. 
This issue deserves more attention than has been 
devoted in the paper.
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